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A FREE APPROPRIATE PUBLIC EDUCATION 

HENRY A. BEYER· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For as much as the good education of children is of singular 
behoof to any Common-wealth. . . . It is therefore ordered that 
the Select men of everie town ... shall have a vigilant eye over 
their brethren & and neighbours, to see, first that none of them 
shall suffer so much barbarism in any of their families as not to 
indeavour to teach by themselves or others, their children & ap­
prentices so much learning as may inable them perfectly to read 
the englishtongue, & knowledge of the Capital lawes: upo[n] 
penaltie qf twentieshillings for each neglect therin.1 
Thus did the early settlers of the Massachusetts Bay Colony ex­
press their concern with establishing a uniform code of education. 
Such stress on the importance of education has been a continuing 
hallmark of American society. Thomas Jefferson was a strong advo­
cate of government's responsibility to foster education as the basis of 
an informed citizenry, an essential of democratic government: 
Every government degenerates when trusted to the rulers of the 
people alone. The people themselves therefore are its only safe 
depositories. And to render even them safe, their minds must be 
improved to a certain degree. . . . An amendment of our [Vir­
ginia] constitution must here come in aid of the public education.2 
Noah Webster observed that 
[t]he general education of youth is an article in which the Ameri­
can states are superior to all nations. . .. The institution of 
schools, particularly in the New-England states, where the poorest 
children are instructed in reading, writing, and arithmetic at the 
• Interim Director, Center for Law and Health Sciences, Boston University 
School of Law. B.S., Duquesne University, 1954; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1973. The 
author wishes to express his appreciation for the research assistance of Leslie R. Miller, 
Jackson College, Tufts University and Deborah M. Friedman, Boston University School 
of Law. 
I. Massachusetts Bay School Law (1642), reprinted in THE LAWS AND LIBERTIES 
OF MASSACHUSETTS II (reprint ed. 1929) (emphasis deleted). 
2. T. JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 148 (W. Peden ed. 1954). 
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public expen[s]e, is a noble regulation, calculated to dignify the 
human species.3 
Despite such early and continuing pronouncements, many 
American citizens have historically been omitted from the main­
stream of the educational movement. The Supreme Court's 1954 de­
cision in Brown v. Board of Education 4 constituted a major legal 
initiative to right one aspect of this wrong. There, the Court recog­
nized that "[i]n these days, it is doubtful that any child may reason­
ably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of 
an education."5 The Court went on to hold that "[s]uch an opportu­
nity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which 
must be made available to all on equal terms."6 
Although, in Brown, the Court was addressing specifically the 
right of black children not to be segregated from white children in 
the educational process, the Court's words could have been applied 
without difficulty to millions of children with mental or physical 
handicaps. The great majority of public school districts were segre­
gating such children from their nonhandicapped peers, were provid­
ing them with grossly inappropriate educations from which they 
could draw little if any benefit, or were excluding them entirely from 
public educational systems.7 These practices continued for decades 
after the Brown decision. In 1972, for example, there were approxi­
mately "22,000 retarded, emotionally disturbed, blind, deaf, and 
speech or learning disabled children" in Washington, D.C., and 
"perhaps as many as 18,000 of these children [were] not being fur­
nished with programs of specialized education."8 The D.C. Board of 
Education conceded that an estimated "12,340 handicapped children 
were not to be served in the 1971-72 school year."9 The situation in 
most states was not unlike that in the District of Columbia. 10 Penn­
sylvania's 1965 "Mental Retardation Plan," for instance, estimated 
3. N. Webster, SKETCHES OF AMERICAN POLICY 28 (H. Warfel ed. 1937). 
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
5. Id. at 493. 
6. Id. 
7. Burgdorf & Burgdorf. A Hislor), of Unequal Trealmenl: The Qualificalions of 
Handicapped Persons as a "Suspeci Class" Under Ihe Equal Proleclion Clouse, 15 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 855, 869 (1975). 
8. Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 868 (D.D.C. 1972). 
9. Id. at 869. 
10. In 1975. the United States Congress found that of the roughly eight million 
children with handicaps in the United States, approximately one-million were excluded 
entirely from the public school system and more than half were receiving an inappropri­
ate education. 20 U.S.c. § 1400(b)(l), (3), (4) (Supp. V 1981). 
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that 70,000 to .80,000 children with mental retardation between the 
ages of five and twenty-one "were denied access to any public educa­
tion services in schools, home or day care or other community facili­
ties, or state residential institutions." II 
Thus, as the 1970's commenced, the need and the moral right 
were apparent. This article will discuss how that need has been ad., 
dressed and specific legal rights created through legislation and liti­
gation, particularly in the federal Education for All Handicapped 
Children Act (EAHCA).12 It will then examine the Supreme Court's 
interpretation of that Act in Board ojEducation v. Rowley, 13 and will 
finally consider the effect of the Rowley decision on the future educa­
tional rights of children with handicaps. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The PARC and Mills Decisions 
In 1971 and 1972, two class actions based on equal protection 
and due process grounds marked the beginning of change in this 
area. These suitS-Pennsylvania Association jor Retarded Children 
(PARe) v. Pennsylvania 14 and Mills v. Board ofEducation 15~stab­
lished by consent agreement and court orders the following legal 
principles and rights: (1) All children are capable of benefitting from 
education and training;16 (2) all children are entitled to free public 
education and training appropriate to their learning capacities; 17 and 
(3) all children are entitled to as normal an educational placement as 
possible. That is, placement in a regular public school class is pref­
erable to placement in a special public school class; placement in a 
special class in the public school is preferable to placement in a spe­
cial school or program. IS 
In Mills, a federal district court rejected the District of Colum­
bia's argument that the District lacked the funding to educate all of 
its children with handicaps. 
If sufficient funds are not available to finance all of the services 
11. Pennsylvania Ass'o for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 
296 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (citing the Commonwealth's Mental Retardation Plan (C.M.R.P.) at 
4,92,93, 142) (emphasis in original), mod!lYlirg, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971). 
12. 20 U.S.c. §§ 1400-1420 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
13. 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982). 
14. 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), mod(fied, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972). 
15. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). 
16. fd. at 872; see 334 F. Supp. at 1259. 
17. 348 F. Supp. at 871, 874; 334 F. Supp. at 1260. 
18. 348 F. Supp. at 880; 334 F. Supp. at 1260. 
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and programs that are needed and desirable in the system then the 
available funds must be expended equitably in such a manner that 
no child is entirely excluded from a publicly supported education 
consistent with his needs and ability to benefit therefrom. The in­
adequacies of the District of Columbia Public School System 
whether occasioned by insufficient funding or administrative inef­
ficiency, certainly cannot be permitted to bear more heavily on the 
'exceptional' or handicapped children than on the normal child. 19 
B. United States Supreme Court Decisions 
In 1973, some advocates for citizens with handicaps expressed 
concern that statements made by the Court in San Antonio Independ­
ent School District v. Rodriguez ,20 to the effect that public education 
is not a fundamental constitutional right,21 might seriously undercut 
the principles established in PARC and Mills. Subsequent cases 
have shown, however, that the holding ofRodriguez could be limited 
to the issue of methods of public school financing and that it had 
little effect on the educational rights of children with handicaps.22 
Of greater relevance was the high Court's 1974 decision in Lau 
v. Nichols .23 There, the Court considered the situation of 1800 pub­
lic school children in San Francisco who were of Chinese ancestry. 
The children did not understand English and were not provided with . 
supplemental instruction or services to rectify this language defi­
ciency. The Court recognized that the children were "certain to find 
their classroom experiences wholly incomprehensible. . . ."24 The 
Court acknowledged that the children were being "effectively fore­
closed from any meaningful education"25 and ruled that the school 
system's practices amounted to illegal discrimination.26 The plight 
of these children was remarkably similar to the situation of many 
children with handicaps in schools devoid of special education or 
related services. 
19. 348 F. Supp. at 876. 
20. 411 U:S. I (1973). 
21. Id. at 35. 
22. See, e.g., Frederick L. v. Thomas, 408 F. Supp. 832, 835 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Fi­
alkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946, 957-58 (E.D. Pa. 1975); In re G.H., 218 N.W.2d 
441, 446 (N.D. 1974); see also Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 102 S. Ct. at 3043-44 (1982) 
(citing PARe and Mills with apparent approval). 
23. 414 U.S. 563 (1974). 
24. Id. at 566. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. The school system's practices were found to be in violation of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964. Id at 566-69. 
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C. Slate Legislalion 
In addition to court actions relevant to the educational rights of 
children with handicaps, the early 1970's witnessed state legislative 
action in this area. Prior to 1971, many state statutes contained pro­
visions excluding from the educational system children with certain 
physical or mental conditions.27 In 1970, only fourteen states had 
statutes mandating appropriate education to children with handi­
caps.28 By 1974, however, this number had grown to forty-six. 29 
Some of these state laws, such as Massachusetts' "Chapter 766"30 
constituted sweeping revisions of previous special education legisla­
tion and served as models31 for the federal EAHCA.32 
D. Federal Legislation and Lower Court Interpretations 
Congress first demonstrated its concern with education of chil­
dren with handicaps in 1966 when it amended the El"ementary and 
Secondary Education Act of 1965.33 The amendment established a 
grant program "for the purpose of assisting the States in the initia­
tion, expansion, and improvement of programs and projects. . . for 
the education of handicapped children ...."34 That program was 
replaced in 1970 by the Education for the Handicapped Act.35 Both 
the 1966 and 1970 acts were "aimed primarily at stimulating the 
States to develop educational resources and to train persolliiel for 
educating the handicapped."36 Neither contained specific guidelines 
27. Comptroller General of the United States, Disparities Still Exist in Who Gets 
SpeCial Education 3 (Sept. 30, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Disparities Still Exist]. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. 1972 Mass. Acts 692 (codified as amended at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71B 
(West 1982). For a description of the goals and provisions of this act, see J.P. WILSON, 
THE RIGHTS OF ADOLESCENTS IN THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 166·91 (1978). For a 
description of the actual operation of chapter 766, and its provisions for a parent's appeal 
of a school's special education decision, see generally M. BUDOFF, A. ORENSTEIN & c. 
KERVICK, DUE PROCESS IN SPECIAL EDUCATION: ON GOING TO A HEARING (1982) 
[hereinafter cited as M. BUDOFF]. 
31. See J.P. WILSON, supra note 30, at 166. 
32. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400­
1420 (1976 & Supp. V 1981»; see infra text accompanying notes 40-135. 
33. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.c. §§ 236-244 
(1976 & Supp. V 1981». 
34. Elementary and Secondary Education Amendments of 1966. Pub. L. No. 89­
750, sec. 161, § 601(a), 80 Stat. 1191, 1204; see also Act of Nov. I, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89­
313, sec. 6, § 5, 79 Stat. 1158, 1161-62 (amending title I of the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act of 1965). 
35. Pub. L. No. 91-230, §§ 601-662,84 Stat. 175-88 (1970). 
36. Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 102 S. Ct. at 3037 (1982) (citing S. REP. No. 168, 
368 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:363 
for state use of the federal grants. 
In 1974, spurred by the PARe and Mills decisions,37 Congress 
greatly increased federal funding for the education of children with 
handicaps and, for the first time, required states receiving these 
funds to adopt "a goal of providing full educational opportunities to 
all handicapped children. . .."38 The 1974 statute was recognized 
as an interim measure, adopted" 'in order to give the Congress an 
additional year in which to study what, if any, additional Federal 
assistance [was] required to enable the States to meet the needs of 
handicapped children.' "39 In the following year, Congress enacted 
and the President signed Public Law 94-142, the Education for All 
Handicapped Children Act,40 a comprehensive statute that has revo­
lutionized such education throughout the nation. 
The EAHCA (the Act) requires that each state41 receiving fed­
eral funds under the Act42 provide to each school-age child43 a "free 
appropriate public education."44 The Act adopted the major princi­
ples laid down in PARe and Mills 45 as essential elements of such an 
education. The Act mandates that an individual education program 
(IEP) be developed to meet the unique educational needs of each 
child with a handicap,46 that the child's parents or guardian be af~ 
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in 1975 U.S. Code Congo & Ad. News 1425. 1429; H.R. 
REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1975) [hereinafter cited as H.R. Rep. No. 332]). 
See also Comptroller General of the United States, Unanswered Questions on Educating 
Handicapped Children in Local Public Schools 1-3 (Feb. 5, 1981). 
37. See supra text accompanying notes 14-19. 
38. Education amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 615(c)( I). 88 Stat. 579. 
583 (current version at 20 U.S.c. § 1414 (1976)). 
39. Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 102 S. Ct. at 3037 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 332. 
supra note 36, at 4). 
40. 20 U.S.c. §§ 1400-1420 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
41. The term "state" includes, in addition to the fifty states, the District of Colum­
bia, the Commonwealth of Pueno Rico, Guam, American Samoa. the Virgin Islands. 
and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. 20 U.S.c. § 140 I (6) (1976). 
. 42. In 1982, all states except New Mexico were recipients of federal funds under 
the EAHCA. Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 102 S. Ct. 3034, 3039 (1982). 
43. The EAHCA required that by Sept. I, 1980, aU handicapped children between 
the ages of three and twenty-one must be accomodated, provided that state law does not 
prohibit or fail to authorize public education for nonhandicapped children between three 
and five years or eighteen to twenty-one years of age. 20 U.S.c. § 1412(2)(B) (1976). At 
least one federal coun required provision of services to a nineteen-year-old student 
before the statutory 1980 date. Capello v. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ., No. 79­
1006 (D.D.C. Jan. 23, 1979); see also Frankel v. Commissioner of Educ.. 480 F. Supp. 
1156 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
44. 20 U.S.c. § 1412 (I) (1976). 
45. See supra text accompanying notes 16-18. 
46. 20 U.S.c. §§ 1401(19), 1414(a)(5) (1976). 

The term 'individualized education program' means a written statement for 
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forded the opportunity to assist in shaping the IEP and appeal por­
tions with which they disagree,47 and that children with handicaps 
be "mainstreamed," that is, that they be educated with nonhandicap­
ped children "to the maximum extent appropriate."48 
In cases brought under the EAHCA, perhaps the most difficult 
task confronting judges and administrative hearing officers has been 
interpretation and application of the requirement that the education 
of each child with a handicap be "appropriate."49 According to the 
Act, 
[t]he term "free appropriate public education" means special edu­
cation and related services which (A) have been provided at pub­
lic expense, under public supervision and direction, and without 
charge, (B) meet the standards of the State educational agency, 
(C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary 
school education in the State involved, and (D) are provided in 
conformity with the individualized education program required 
under ... this title. 50 . 
In further explication, the Act defines two components of a free, ap­
propriate public education-special education and related services: 
The term "special education" means specially designed instruc­
tion, at no cost to parents or guardians, to meet the unique needs 
of a handicapped child, including classroom instruction, instruc­
each handicapped child developed in any meeting by a representative of the 
local educational agency, ... the teacher, the parents or guardian of such 
child, and whenever appropriate, such child, which statements shall include 
(A) ... present levels of educational performance of such child, (B) annual 
goals including short-term instructional objectives, (C). . . specific educational 
services to be provided. . . ,and the extent to which such child will be able to 
participate in regular education programs, (D) the projected date for ... such 
services, and (E) appropriate objective criteria and evaluation procedures and 
schedules for determining . . . whether instructional objectives are being 
achieved. 
It!. § 1401(19) (1976). 
47. It!. § 1415(b) (1976). 
48. It!. § 1412(5)(B) (1976). Participating states are to establish procedures to as­
sure that "special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of handicapped children 
from the regular educationaJ environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the 
handicap is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and 
services cannot be achieved satisfactorily." It!. 
49. It!. § 1412(1) (1976). See, e.g., Colin v. Schmidt, 536 F. Supp. 1375 (D.RJ. 
1982); Norris v. Massachusetts Dep't of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 759 (D. Mass. 1981); Bales v. 
Clarke, 523 F. Supp. 1366 (E.D. Va. 1981); Campbell v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 
518 F. Supp. 47 (N.D. Ala. 1981); Buchholtz v. Iowa Dep't of Pub. Instruction. 315 
N.W.2d 789 (Iowa 1982); Shanberg v. Pennsylvania, 57 Pa. Commw. 384,426 A.2d 232 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981). 
50. 20 U.S.c. § 1401(18) (1976). 
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tion in physical education, home instruction, and instruction in 
hospitals and institutions.51 The term "related services" means 
transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and other sup­
portive services (including speech pathology and audiology, psy­
chological services, physical and occupational therapy, recreation, 
and medical and counseling services, except that such medical 
services shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only) as 
may be required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from spe­
cial education ....52 
Although courts had little difficulty in deciding cases involving 
significant failures of educational systems to comply with the proce­
dural requirements of the EAHCA,53 the issue was less clear in many 
other situations. One line of decisions struck down state laws, poli­
cies, and practices limiting free public education to a fixed number 
of days per year. 54 Some children with handicaps, particularly those 
with severe or profound mental retardation or severe emotional dis­
turbances, suffer a significant loss of functional skills and emotional 
development if school is interrupted for a summer vacation. 55 For 
some of these children, the time required to recoup lost capabilities 
when school resumes is significantly greater than that required by 
other, nonhandicapped children.56 A number of judges and various 
administrative tribunals concluded that the inflexible application of 
rules limiting schooling to a fixed number of days prevents or limits 
educators' individual consideration of the unique needs of each 
child. Children who experience significant regression and slow re­
coupment were thus being deprived of an "appropriate" education 
and the educators were in violation of the EAHCA.57 . 
51. Id § 1401(16) (1976). 
52. Id § 1401(17) (1976). 
53. See. e.g., Jose P. v. Ambach, 669 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1982) (failure of state educa­
tional agencies to assure that local educational agencies took actions reasonably neces­
sary to accomplish timely evaluation and placement in appropriate programs of all 
children with handicapping conditions); Mattie T. v. Holladay, No. DC-75-31-S (N.D. 
Miss. Jan. 26, 1979) (consent decree ) (class action challenging denial of educational serv­
ices segregation in separate programs, denial of due process safeguards and the state's 
failure to locate and identify all children with handicaps); Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. 
Supp. 1211 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), affd in part, 623 F.2d 248 (2d Cir. 1980) (class action chal­
lenging deficiencies in IEP and due process procedures). 
54. Typically, the school term was fixed at 180 days per year. See infra note 57 and 
accompanying text. 
55. See Armstrong v. Kline, 476 F. Supp. 583, 593 (E.D. Pa. 1979), remanded sub 
nom., Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom., Scanlon 
v. Battle, 452 U.S. 968 (1981). 
56. Id at 595. 
57. See, e.g., Georgia Ass'n of Retarded Citizens v. McDaniel, 511 F. Supp. 1263 
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In a broad array of decisions, courts have held that the Act's 
"appropriate" education requirement mandates a sufficiently high 
teacher-pupil ratio for some students,58 private school placement for 
a few,59 and maximum contact with nonhandicapped students for 
others.60 The judiciary, however, also recognized ,the limits of the 
EAHCA. A number of courts have held that a child's right to an 
"appropriate" education does not constitute a right to the best possi­
ble education.61 In Springdale School District No. 50 v. Grace ,62 for 
example, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that a deaf 
student could ,receive an appropriate education (which included in­
struction by a certified teacher of deaf persons) within her local 
school district, even though the student could learn more quickly in 
a residential school for the deaf located in another city: 
The fact that [the child] may not, like many nonhandicapped chil­
(N.D. Ga. 1981); Fetzer v. Mandan Pub. School Dist., No. AI-80-40 (D.N.D. Oct. 17, 
1980); Armstrong v. Kline, 476 F. Supp. 583 (E.D. Pa. 1979), remanded sub nom., Battle 
v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom., Scanlon v. Penn­
sylvania, 452 U.S. 968 (1981); In re Richard K, No. 79-20 (Hooksett, N.H. Dist. Ct. June 
8, 1979). In re Mahoney, (Bend, Ore. Aug. 29, 1978) (administrative hearing pursuant to 
Pub. L. No. 94-142). 
An Office for Civil Rights (OCR) Opinion concluded that the New Ham'pshire De­
partment of Education had denied eleven complainants and "all handicapped children in 
New Hampshire who may require an educational program in excess of 180 days per 
year" an appropriate education through an "unwritten policy" and burdensome statute, 
standards, and regulations which created a presumption that a 180-day school year is the 
general rule. Office for Civil Rights (OCR), Opinion Regarding Complaint No, 01-79­
1088 (HEW, Boston, MA, Jan. 18, 1980). OCR ruled that the Department had thus 
violated section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.~.c. § 794 (1976 & Supp. V 
1981), which bans discrimination on the basis of handicap in federally assisted programs. 
OCR Opinion, supra, at 8. Of course, not all challenges to 180-day schooling limitations 
have succeeded. See, e.g., Bales v. Clarke, 523 F. SllPP. 1366, 1370 (E.D. Va. 1981); 
Anderson v. Thompson, 495 F. Supp. 1256 (E.D. Wis. 1980), aJl'd, 658 F.2d 1205 (7th 
Cir. 1981); In re R.C., No. 1978-25 (Georgia Bd. of Educ. Oct. 12, 1978). 
58. See, e.g., Colin K. v. Schmidt, 536 F. Supp. 1375, 1386-87 (D.R.I. 1982). 
59. See, e.g., Norris v. Massachusetts Dep't of Educ., 529 F.Supp. 759, 766-67 (D. 
Mass. 1981). Furthermore, having placed a student in an approved program, a state may 
not avoid continued responsibility for the child by exercising its valid power of removing 
the particular private school from the state list of approved programs. Vander Malle v. 
Ambach, 673 F.2d 49, 53 (2d Cir. 1982). 
60. See, e.g., Campbell v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 518 F. Supp. 47, 55 
(N.D. Ala. 1981). 
61. See, e.g., Springdale School Dist. No. 50 v. Grace, 656 F.2d 300, 304-06 (8th 
Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 3504 (1982) (in light of Board of Educ. v. 
Rowley, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982»; Bales v. Clarke, 523 F. Supp. 1366 (E.D. Va. 1981); 
Buchholtz v. Iowa Dep't of Pub. Instruction, 315 N.W.2d 789, 793 (Iowa 1982); Shanberg 
v. Pennsylvania, 57 Pa. Commw. 384, 386, 426 A.2d 232, 233 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981). 
62. 656 F.2d 300 (8th Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 3504 (1982) (in 
light of Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982». 
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dren, reach her full potential is not due to any error in the district 
court's interpretation of the Act or in its finding that the [local 
school] could appropriately educate [her], but instead may well 
result from forces outside the school enviroru.ilent.63 
Interpreting the "related services" requirement also occupied 
considerable judicial time. A number of courts recognized the right 
of students with handicaps to school-supplied or paid alternative 
transportation to their educational programs, when the transporta­
tion provided to nonhandicapped students was unsuitable because of 
the particular handicaps, schedules, or geographic locations in­
volved.64 Other cases held psychotherapy to be a "related service" 
that school districts must provide to certain children. with severe 
emotional disturbances to enable them to benefit from special 
education.65 
Because of the substantial cost of residential placements, school 
districts have frequently resisted parents' requests that they be pro­
vided as a related service. Courts and administrative tribunals, how- . 
ever, have sometimes required such placements.66 In Kruelle v. 
Biggs,67 the federal district court in Delaware decided that, because . 
of an eleven-year-old boy's combination of physical and mental 
handicaps, (cerebral palsy and profound mental retardation), "it 
would appear that full-time care is necessary in order to allow [him] 
to learn."68 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals,69 noting that the 
boy had the social skills of a six-month old child, could not commu­
nicate, walk, dress himself, or eat unaided, affirmed the lower court's 
ruling that the State Board of Education must provide a residential 
placement appropriate to the boy's unique needs.70 
In North v. Dis/rict ofColumbia Board ofEducation,71 the board 
argued that one student's educational needs could be satisfied in a 
63. 656 F.2d at 305. 
64. See, e.g., Pinkerton v. Moye, 509 F. Supp. 107, 115 (W.D. Va. 1981); In re Scott 
K, 92 Misc. 2d 681, 685-86, 400 N.Y.S.2d 289, 291 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1977). 
65. See, e.g., Kruelle v. New Castle County School Dist., 642 F.2d 687. 691-92 (3d· 
Cir. 1981); Papacoda v. Connecticut, 528 F. Supp. 68, 72 (D. Conn. 1981); Gladys J. and 
Laura J. v. Pearland lndep. School Dist., 520 F. Supp. 869, 878-79 (S.D. Tex. 1981); In re 
"A" Family, 602 P.2d 157, 170 (Mont. 1979). 
66. See, e.g., Erdman v. Connecticut, No. H80-253 (D. Conn. Aug. 22. 1980); 
CapellO v. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ., No. 79-1006 (D.D.C. Jan. 23, 1980). 
67. 489 F. Supp. 169 (D. Del. 1980), a./Td sub nom., Kruelle v. New Castle County 
School Dist., 642 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1981). 
68. 489 F. Supp. at 174. 
69. Kruelle v. New Castle County School Dist., 642 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1981). 
70. Id. at 698-99. 
71. 471 F. Supp. 136 (D.D.C. 1979). 
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day-care setting and that only his emotional needs required a resi­
dential placement; the board should therefore not be required to 
bear the cost of his placement. 72 The federal district court for the 
District of Columbia, however, granted a preliminary injunction, 
finding that the boy's emotional and educational problems were so 
completely intertwined as to require the board to bear the cost under 
the EAHCA.73 
Some children with handicaps require certain health related 
services to enable them to attend school. A federal court in Texas 
found that air-conditioning of a regular public school classroom was 
an EAHCA related service that the school must provide for a seven­
year-old boy who was unable to control his body temperature.74 The 
air-conditioning enabled the boy to leave the "Plexiglass box" in 
which he had attended classes and join the mainstream environment 
of the classroom.75 A more commonly required service, which has 
figured in a number of cases, is clean, intermittent catheterization. 
After some initial hesitation,76 several courts came to recognize this 
technique as one of the related services which schools must provide 
to some children under the EAHCA.77 Also, at least one federal 
court has found that the assistance needed by a four-year-old child 
with cystic fibrosis and tracheomalacia in order to insert and remove 
a tracheotomy tube also qualifies as a related service to be provided 
by the school under the Act.78 
III. ROWLEY 
The "related services" question that has attracted the greatest 
72. Id at 139. 
73. Id at 141-42. 
74. Espino v. Besteiro, 520 F. Supp. 905, 911-12, 914 (S.D. Tex. 1981). 
75. Id at 911-12. 
76. See, e.g., Tatro v, Texas, 481 F. Supp. 1224, 1228-29 (N,D. Tex. 1979), vacared 
and remanded, 625 F.2d 557 (5th CiT. 1980); see also Notice of Interpretation, 46 Fed. 
Reg. 4912 (1981) (clean intermittent catheterization is a "related service" required by 
some children under EAHCA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973); Notice 
of Postponement oflnterpretation, 46 Fed, Reg. 25,614 (1981) (effective date of the no­
tice of interpretation is postponed until funher notice to "permit a comprehensive review 
of the related services requirements" of EAHCA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973. "[P)ending a final determination, .. the provision of clean intermittent 
catheterization as a related service will be treated as an allowable cost" under EAHCA). 
77. Tatro v. Texas, 625 F.2d 557, 562 (5th CiT. 1980); Tokarcik v. Forest Hills 
School Dist., 49 U.S.L.W. 2336 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (mem.), affd. 665 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 
1981). cerro dened, 102 S. Ct. 3508 (1982). 
78. Hawaii Dep't of Educ. v. Katherine D" 531 F. Supp, 517,525-26 D, Hawaii 
1982). 
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attention, however, is whether the EAHCA entitles a child with a 
severe hearing impairment to the services of a school-provided sign 
language interpreter in the regular school classroom. In a 1979 case, 
In re M W ,79 an administrative hearing officer in the State of Geor­
gia decided that such interpreter services were required for a boy 
with a serious hearing impairment under both the EAHCA and sec­
tion 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.80 But the question re­
mained generally undecided until June 28, 1982. On that date, the 
Supreme Court of the United States announced its opinion in the 
first case in which it had considered the EAHCA-Board ofEduca­
tion v. Rowley.81 In a split decision, the court ruled that the school 
district did not have to provide Amy Rowley, a deaf elementary 
school student, with a sign language interpreter in order to satisfy the 
free, appropriate public education requirement of the Act.82 
The decision has been viewed by some observers as striking a 
serious blow to the educational rights of children with handicaps.83 
Although hardly a victory for such rights, neither does the opinion 
sound their death knell. It is a truism that hard cases make bad law. 
It is equally true, however, that easy cases make misleading law 
when their rulings are read too broadly and when they are applied 
by courts, commentators, or administrators to situations differing 
substantially from the simple case in which the rules were developed. 
Avoiding the danger inherent in misapplication of the Rowley deci­
sion necessitates careful consideration of precisely what the Court 
did and did not say about the EAHCA. Because the unique facts of 
this case weigh so heavily in its outcome, a full recitation of those 
details is required. 
Amy Rowley, an eight-year-old child with a severe hearing im­
pairment was enrolled in a regular classroom of the Furnace Woods 
School, in Peekskill, New York.84 Before beginning Amy's school­
ing and after a planning meeting with her parents, the school admin­
79. No. S1979-1 (Floyd County, Ga., Bd. of Educ. Mar. 6, 1979). 
80. 29 U.S.c. § 794 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). SeClion 504 bans discrimination on 
the basis of handicap in programs receiving federal financial assistance. Its requirements 
were interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States in another case involving an 
individual with a severe hearing impairment. Southeastern Community College v. Da­
vis, 442 U.S. 397,405-07 (1979). 
81. 102 S. Ct. 3034 (l982). 
82. lti. at 3052. 
83. See e.g., I American Coalition of Citizens with Disabilities, ACCD News Net 
(June 1982). "We find this decision shocking. It condones inferior and inadequate edu­
cation for handicapped children." lti. at 10. 
84. 102 S. Ct. at 3039-40. 
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istrators made certain preparations for her arrival. Several of the 
administrators attended a course in understanding sign-language 
and a teletype machine was installed in the principal's office to facili­
tate communications with Amy's parents, who are also deaf. Amy, 
who is an excellent lipreader and has minimal residual hearing, was 
placed in a regular kindergarten class. After a time, the school pro­
vided her with an FM wireless hearing aid through which she could 
hear words spoken by the teacher or fellow students into a transmit­
ter during certain classroom activities. A sign-language interpreter 
was assigned to the kindergarten class for a two-week experimental 
period, but was removed after he reported that Amy did not need his 
services at that time.8S Amy successfully completed kindergarten. 
In the fall of her first-grade year, an IEP was prepared for Amy 
as required by the EAHCA. It provided that she should be educated 
in a regular classroom, should continue to use the FM hearing aid, 
and should receive instruction from a tutor for deaf individuals for 
one hour each day and from a speech therapist for three hours each 
week.86 Amy's parents agreed with the IEP insofar as it went, but 
insisted that, in addition, she be provided with a qualified sign-lan­
guage interpreter in all academic classes.S7 The school administra­
tors, after consulting the school district's Committee on the 
Handicapped, which had received testimony from Amy's parents, 
teachers, and o~hers on the education of deaf individuals, concluded 
that Amy did not need an interpreter in her first-grade classroom.S8 
The Rowleys, following the EAHCA appeals procedure, then 
took their demand for' an interpreter to an independent examiner. 
After a hearing, the examiner agreed with the school administrators 
that Amy did not need an interpreter because she was "achieving 
educationally, academically, and socially" without such assistance.89 
On appeal, the examiner's decision was affirmed by the New York 
Commissioner of Education.90 Following the Act's provision for ju­
dicial review, the Rowleys then brought an action in federal court 
85. 102 S. Ct. at 3039. The district court, considering the case in 1980, noted how­
ever, that the interpreter's "recommendation was strictly limited to the particular class 
for which he had rendered the service, and did not rule out the necessity of interpretation 
in other classes or in subsequent academic years." Rowley v. Board of Educ., 483 F. 
Supp. 528, 530 (S.D. N.Y.), affd, 632 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 3034 
(1982). 
86. 102 S. Ct. at 3039. 
87. Iii. 
88. Iii. 
89. Iii. at 3040. 
90. Iii. 
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claiming that the school's refusal to provide interpreter services con­
stituted a denial of the "free appropriate public education" guaran­
teed by the Act.91 
The district court agreed with the Rowleys.92 In struggling to 
give meaning to the term "appropriate" education, the court rejected 
what it saw as two possible extreme interpretations: (1)" 'Adequate' 
education-that is, an education substantial enough to facilitate a 
child's progress from one grade to another and to enable him or her 
to earn a high school diploma"; and (2) an education "which enables 
the handicapped child to achieve his or her full potential."93 In­
stead, the district court settled on an intermediate standard which 
"would require that each handicapped child be given an opportunity 
to achieve his full potential commensurate with the opportunity pro­
vided to other children."94 
[T}his standard requires something more than the "adequate" ed­
ucation described above. On the other hand, since even the best 
public schools lack the resources to enable every child to achieve 
his full potential, the standard would not require them to go so 
far. . . . [This standard} requires that the potential of the handi­
capped child be measured and compared to his or her perform­
ance, and that the resulting differential or "shortfall" be compared 
to the shortfall experienced by non-handicapped children.95 
Although the district court noted that Amy is a "bright, well-ad­
justed child ... [who] performs better than the average child in her 
class and is advancing easily from grade to grade,"96 it found that 
the school administrators had "ignore[d] the importance of compar­
ing her performance to that of nonhandicapped students of similar 
intellectual calibre and comparable energy and initiative."97 In the 
court's opinion, Amy's "educational shortfall is greater than that of 
her peers."98 Using the standard it had developed to measure "ap­
propriateness"99 and relying on expert testimony that "every deaf 
91. Id 
92. Rowley v. Board of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528 (S.D.N.Y.), off'd. 632 F.2d 945 (2d . 
Cir. 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982). 





98. Id at 535. 
99. See supra text accompanying note 94. 
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child fares better in class with an interpreter,"IOO the district court 
concluded that Amy was entitled to an interpreter "to bring her edu­
cational opportunity up to the level of the educational opportunity 
being offered to her non-handicapped peers."101 It found that 
"Amy's education would be more 'appropriate' with than without an 
interpreter." 102 
On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in a two-to­
one decision, affirmed the district court's judgment, 103 including, ap­
parently, its standard for "appropriateness" .of an education. 104 The 
appeals court, however, took pains to emphasize the narrowness of 
its holding. "The evidence upon which our decision rests is con­
cerned with a particular child, her atypical family, her upbringing 
and training since birth, and her classroom experience. In short our 
decision is limited to the unique facts of this case and is not intended 
as authority beyond this case." 105 
The Supreme Court, after reviewing the legislative history of 
the EAHCA, rejected the lower courts' standard lO6 for determining 
when an educational program is "appropriate": "The District Court 
and the Court of Appeals ... erred when they held that the Act 
requires New York to maximize the potential of each handicapped 
child commensurate with the opportunity provided nonhandicapped 
. children."107 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the five-member major­
ity,108 read the Act's intent as "more to open the door of public edu­
cation to handicapped children on appropriate terms than to 
guarantee any particular level of education once inside."I09 He con­
cluded that Congress has sought "primarily to identify and evaluate 
handicapped children, and to provide them with access to a free 
100. Rowley v. Board of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528, 535 (S.D.N.Y.). offd, 632 F.2d 
945 (2d Cir. 1980). rev'd. 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982) (emphasis in original). 
101. Id 
102. Id at 536. 
103. Rowley v. Board of Educ.• 632 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 3034 
(1982). 
104. The court of appeals stated its agreement with the district court's conclusions 
of law. Id at 947. 
105. Id at 948. 
106. See supra text accompanying note 94. 
107. 102 S. Ct. at 3048. Further, U[w)hatever Congress meant by an 'appropriate' 
education. it is clear that it did not mean a potential-maximizing education." Id, at 3046 
n.21. 
108. The majority was composed of Justice Rehnquist. Chief Justice Burger, and 
Justices Powell, Stevens. and O'Connor. 
109. 102 S. Ct. at 3043. 
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public education." 110 Justice Rehnquist also noted that: "Congress 
did not impose upon the States any greater substantive educational 
standard than would be necessary to make such access meaning­
ful."111 He stated that "if personalized instruction is being provided 
with sufficient supportive services to permit the child to benefit from 
the instruction, and the other items on the definitional checklist are 
satisfied, the child is receiving a 'free appropriate public education' 
as defined by the Act." 1 12 
In the opinion of advocates for children with handicaps and of 
the Court's three dissenting members,113 the foregoing interpreta­
tions of Congressional intent are clearly erroneous. Justice White, 
writing for the dissent, argued that "[t]he legislative history. . . di­
rectly supports the conclusion that the Act intends to give handi­
capped children an educational opportunity commensurate with that 
given other children." 1 14 He concluded that the majority's standard 
for deciding that Amy was receiving an appropriate education-that 
she was receiving "some specialized instruction from which she ob­
tained some benefit [which enabled her to pass] from grade to grade 
... falls far short of what .the Act intended." 1 15 
It wo\1ld be a serious mistake, however, to accept the excerpts 
quoted thus far as a fair summary of the Court's opinion. Among its 
more positive aspects, the opinion explicitly acknowledged that the 
EAHCA requires "personalized instruction," 116 that is "educational 
instruction specially designed to meet the unique needs of the handi­
capped child." 1 17 The decision also recognized the Act's mandate of 
related services; that the instruction of a child with a handicap must 
be "supported by such services as are necessary to permit the child to 
'benefit' from the instruction."118 The Court further discerned that 
Congress intended that children with handicaps be provided with 
something exIra in the way of educational services: "[F]urnishing 
handicapped children with only such services as are available to 
110. Id., at 304S. 
Ill. Id. at 3043; if. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566 (1974) (foreclosure of mean­
ingful education amounted to illegal discrimination). 
112. \02 S. Ct. at 3042. By "definitional checklist," the Coun was referring to 
requisite elements "A" through "0" in the EAHCA's definition of "free appropriate 
public education." 20 U.S.c. § 140I(lS)(A)-(0) (1976). See supra text accompanying 
note 50. 
113. Justices White, Brennan, and Marshall joined in a dissenting opinion. 
114. \02 S. Ct. at 3055 (White, J., dissenting). 
115. Id. (emphasis in original). 
116. Id. at 3049. 
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nonhandicapped children would in all probability fall short of the 
statutory requirement of 'free appropriate public education 
, "119 
The Court's principal holding was that appropriate education 
consists of "personalized instruction with sufficient support services 
to permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction." 120 
But how great must the "benefit" be? This determination, the Court 
said, presents "a more difficult problem"121 and it explicitly refused 
to provide a general answer: 
We do not attempt today to establish anyone test for determining 
the adequacy of educational benefits conferred upon all children 
covered by the Act. Because in this case we are presented with a 
handicapped child who is receiving substantial specialized instruc­
tion and related services, and who is performing above average in 
the regular classrooms of a public school system, we confine our 
analysis to that situation. 122 
The Court's characterization of Amy Rowley's specialized in­
struction and related services as "substantial" was hardly an over­
statement. 123 The school had provided her, in Justice Blackmun's 
words, with "considerably more than 'a teacher with a loud 
voice.' "124 It had made commendable efforts to accommodate her 
needs. There is much force in Justice Blackmun's conclusion that 
Amy's educational program, "viewed as a whole, offered her .an op­
portunity to understand and participate in the classroom that was 
substantially equal to that given her nonhandicapped classmates." 125 
119. Id at 3047. 
120. Id at 3049 (emphasis added). 
121. Id at 3048. 
122. Id at 3049. The Supreme Court's Limiting of the precedential effect of its 
ruling echoed a similar cautionary notice by the court of appeals. See supra text accom­
panying note 105. 
123. See 102 S. Ct. at 3039. The school had provided a tutor, speech therapist, 
hearing aid and (for a trial period) a sign language interpreter; had installed a teletype 
machine; and had consulted with a Committee on the Handicapped. See supra text ac­
companying note 85. 
124. 102 S. Ct. at 3053 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (borrowing a phrase from the 
Court's dissenters). 
125. Id (emphasis in original). Justice White, in dissent, wrote that Amy, "with­
out a sign language interpreter, comprehends less than half of what is said in the class­
room-less than half of what normal children comprehend." Id at 3055 (White, J., 
dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice White provides no citation on which to base his 
assertion, and the district court opinion raises questions concerning both the percentage 
(less than half) and its basis (what normal children comprehend): 
[B)y making use of her hearing aids and her lipreading skills, which she would 
be doing under ideal classroom conditions, Amy can identify 59% of the words 
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The Supreme Court's conclusion regarding Amy Rowley's per­
formance is unchallenged. She is performing above the average 
level in regular classrooms at a public school. 126 But even here, the 
Court did not attempt to create a general standard from Amy's par­
ticular situation: "We do not hold today that every handicapped 
child who is advancing from grade to grade in a regular public 
school system is automatically receiving a 'free appropriate public 
education.' "127 How a child fares in the grading and advancement 
system of a regular public school classroom environment thus "con­
stitutes an important factor in determining educational benefit,"128 
but such a factor is not dispositive of the issue. 
In Rowley, the Supreme Court set out to define the term "appro­
priate" and to determine the amount of services required by that 
term. The Court ended up explaining the term "appropriate" with 
the terms "meaningful" and "benefit," but refused to define the 
amount of services required to ,satisfy this new standard. Thus, 
while the opinion provided little guidance in determining the level of 
services the Act requires,129 it did not eviscerate Congre,ss' mandate. 
, Rather, in a manner strikingly similar to the Act's core philosophy, 
the Supreme court opted for an individualized approach in weighing 
the SUfficiency of the benefits of Amy's and potentially other chil­
dren's educational programs. 
Whether the Court will continue to eschew generalizations in 
future EAHCA cases remains to be seen. But, at least for the pres­
which are spoken to her. . . . I find that Amy is capable of discriminating con­
siderably less than 100% of what is spoken in class-probably in the neighbor­
hoodoj59%. 
Rowley v. Board of Educ., 483 F. Supp, 528, 532 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 632 F,2d 945 (2d CiT. 
1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982). (emphasis added). Also, it should not be forgotten 
that Amy was provided with one hour of tutoring each day in addition to her classroom 
instruction. See supra text accompanying note 86. 
126. 102 S. Ct. at 3049. "Amy's scores on the Metropolitan Achievement Test were 
about average for her class, and her scores on the Stanford Achievement Test which was 
administered to her in sign language, were well above average. Amy's school records 
establish that she is performing above the median for her class," Rowley v. Board of 
Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528. 532 (S.D,N.Y.) (footnote omitted),affd, 632 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 
1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982), 
127. 102 S, Ct. at 3049 n.25, It is not clear how the Coun would react if a child 
were not making progress. 
128. Id at 3049. The Coun later stated that "[w)hen the handicapped child is 
being educated in the regular classrooms of a public school system, the achievement of 
passing marks and advancement from grade to grade will be one important jactor in 
determining educational benefit." Id at 3051 n.28 (emphasis added). 
129. As Justice White observed, " 'meaningful' is no more enlightening than 'ap­
propriate:" Id at 3055 (White, J., dissenting). 
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ent, no general standard has been established; it is left to those who 
develop and initially review IEPs to determine, in the first instance, 
the type and amount of specialized education and related services 
that are required to give each unique child an appropriate, meaning­
ful education providing sufficient benefit. The Court placed heavy 
emphasis on the fundamental role of those involved in that initial 
determination: "The primary responsibility for formulating the edu­
cation to be accorded a handicapped child, and for choosing the edu­
cational method most suitable to the child's needs, was left by the 
Act to state and local educational agencies in cooperation with the 
parents or guardians of the child."130 
Although courts are not to second-guess these education pro­
gram developers on questions of educational "policy,"131 "theo­
ries,"132 or "methodology,"133 a substantive as well as procedural 
review role for the judiciary was strongly affirmed by the Supreme 
Court: "Congress expressly rejected provisions that would have so 
severely restricted the role of reviewing courts" to reviewing only for 
state compliance with the Act's procedural requirements.l 34 The 
Court went on to state that "a court's inquiry in suits brought under 
[the Act] is twofold. First, has the state complied with the proce­
dures set forth in the Act? And second, is the individualized educa­
tion program developed through the Act's procedures reasonably 
calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits?" 135 
Thus, parents may still tum to the courts for relief not only for cor­
rection of procedural deficiencies in development of their child's 
IEP, but also when they believe that the program, although the result 
of a procedurally correct process, still does not provide the student 
an "appropriate" education. 
130. ld at 3051. 
131. ld "[T]he provision that a reviewing court base its decision on the 'prepon­
derance of the evidence' is by no means an invitation to the courts to substitute their own 
notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities which they re­
view." ld "[C]ourts lack the 'specialized knowledge and experience' necessary to re­
solve the 'persistent and difficult questions of educational policy.' Id at 3052 (citing San 
Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,42 (1973». 
132. 102 S. Ct. at 3052. "[I]t seems highly unlikely that Congress intended courts 
to overturn a State's choice of appropriate educational theories in a proceeding con­
ducted pursuant to § 1415(e)(2)." ld at 3051 (footnote omitted). 
133. "[O]nce a court determines that the requirements of the Act have been met, 
questions of methodOlogy are for resolution by the States." Id at 3052. 
134. Id at 3050. 
135. ld at 3051. (footnotes omitted). Included in a court's procedural inquiry will 
be the determination "that the State has created an IEP for the child in question which 
conforms with the requirements of [the Act]." Id at 3051 n.27. 
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IV. ApPLICATiON OF ROWLEY 
What will be the effect ofRowley on the education of other chil­
dren with handicaps? Insufficient time has elapsed to answer that 
question definitively. A few resulting principles, however, are clear. 
Because the Court explicitly limited its ruling to Amy Rowley's par­
ticular case, the opinion clearly does not signify that every deaf child 
who requires a sign language interpreter will be denied that service. 
Moreover, EAHCA's core principles emerged from the decision in­
tact; Rowley affirmed the rights of children with handicaps: 
(1) to be educated by public schools without charge;136 
(2) to be provided with individualized, beneficial, "meaningful" 
services, designed through the IEP process; 137 
(3) to be "mainstreamed" where possible; 138 
(4) to receive an instructional program that approximates the 
grade levels used in the state's regular education program;139 
(5) to be provided with related and supportive serVices needed to 
derive benefit from their education; 140 
(6) to have parents or guardians actively involved in the plan­
ning of their education;141 
(7) to challenge the adequacy of their education programs in due 
process hearings; 142 and 
(8) to challenge in federal court both the substance of their IEP 
and the procedures 
review.l 43 
afforded for its development and 
Although Rowley's ultimate effect on the education of children 
with handicaps cannot yet be seen, it may be useful to examine how 
the opinion might have affected the pre-Rowley decisions discussed 
earlier in this article. 144 Clearly, Rowley would not have changed the 
outcome of cases such as Springdale, 145 in which courts held that the 





141. Id at 3050. 
142. Id at 3039. 
143. Id at 3050-5\. Because ofRowley'S emphasis on the primary role of local and 
state educational agenCies in developing and reviewing a child's IEP, see id at 3039, 
advocates for children with handicaps would be well advised to contest inappropriate 
programs or inadequate provisions of services at the earliest possible point in the admin­
istrative process. See generally M. BUDOFF, supra note 30. B. CUTLER, UNRAVELING 
THE SPECIAL EDUCATION MAZE: AN ACTION GUIDE FOR PARENTS (1981). 
144. See supra notes 53-78 and accompanying tex\. 
145. Springdale School Dis\. No. 50 v. Grace, 656 F.2d 300 (8th Cir. 1981), vacated 
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right to an "appropriate" education does not constitute a right to the 
best possible education. 146 These decisions might well be viewed as 
harbingers of the more restrictive language of the Rowley opinion. 
And Rowley would only have strengthened the holdings of those 
cases l47 in which school systems were found to. be in significant non­
compliance with procedural provisions of the EAHCAI48 Further­
more, the lower court rulings requiring the provision of related 
services such as transportation,149 catheterization,150 and assistance 
with a tracheotomy tube,151 would be viewed as satisfying even the 
more stringent standards that some may derive from the Rowley 
opinion. These services were required merely "to open the door of 
public education" 152 to the affected children; merely "to provide 
them with access."153 
It is more difficult to speak confidently of Rowley's impact on 
cases where "mainstreaming" of students, with the attendant provi­
sion of required related services, has been ordered by the courtS. 154 
Viewed in one light, the Supreme Court might characterize this issue 
as one involving educational "theory" or "methodology," falling 
within the purview of educators rather than courts. J55 Yet in Rowl­
ey, the Court clearly recognized and noted the "mainstreaming pref­
erence" of the EAHCAI56 Thus, it seems most likely that it would 
and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 3504 (in light of Rowley), on remand, 693 F.2d 41 (8th Cir. 
1982),pelilion/or cert.jiled, 51 U.S.L.W. 3583 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1983) (No. 82-1292). 
146. 656 F.2d at 304. In one post-Rowley decision, Harrell v. Wilson County 
Schools, 293 S.E.2d 687 (N.c. Ct. App.), appeal denied, 295 S.E.2d 759 (N.C. 1982),peli­
lion/or cert.jiled, 51 U.S.L.W. 3512 (U.S. Jan. 3, 1983) (No. 82-1111), the court held that 
neither the EAHCA nor state law requires a local school agency to provide students with 
handicaps the most appropriate education. In dicta, however, the court interpreted the 
state special education statute by quoting Justice White's dissent in Rowley: "We believe 
that our own General Assembly 'intended to eliminate the effects of the handicap, at least 
to the extent that the child will be given an equal opportunity to learn if that is reason­
ably possible. . . .' Under this standard a handicapped child should be given an oppor­
tunity to achieve his full potential commensurate with that given other children." Id. at 
690 (quoting Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 102 S. Ct. at 3055 (White, J., dissenting». 
147. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
148. "[W)e think that the importance Congress attached to these procedural safe­
guards cannot be gainsaid." 102 S. Ct. at 3050. 
149. Pinkerton v. Moye, 509 F. Supp. 107, 115 (W.O. Va. 1981); In re Scott K, 92 
Misc. 2d 681, 685-86, 400 N.Y.S.2d 289, 291 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1977). 
ISO. Tatro v. Texas, 625 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1980). 
151. Hawaii Dep't of Educ. v. Katherine D., 531 F. Supp. 517 (D. Hawaii 1982). 
152. 102 S. Ct. at 3036. 
153. Id. 
154. Espino v. Besteiro, 520 F. Supp. 905 (S.D. Tex. 1981); Campbell v. Talladega 
County Bd. of Educ., 518 F. Supp. 47 (N.D. Ala. 1981). 
155. See 102 S. Ct. at 3036. 
156. Id. at 3049 & n.24. 
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decide such cases under its general rule: Are the services required to 
permit the child to benefit sufficiently from the instruction?157 In 
determining sufficiency of the benefit, the Court would probably give 
considerable weight to the child's IEP and any administrative hear­
ing decisions addressing it,158 provided that all due process proce­
dural requirements have been followed. 159 
Children with handicaps will find considerable support in Rowl­
ey for a right to an extended school year,160 provided that such is 
called for in their IEP's. Consider the reasoning of the Third Circuit 
in BailIe v. Pennsylvania: 161 
We believe the inflexibility of the defendants' policy of refusing 
to provide more than 180 days of education to be incompatible 
with the Act's emphasis on the individual. Rather than ascertain­
ing the reasonable educational needs of each child in light of rea­
sonable educational goals, and establishing a reasonable program 
to attain those goals, the 180 day rule imposes with rigid certainty 
a program restriction which may be wholly inappropriate to the 
child's educational objectives. This the Act will not permit. 102 
Such reasoning would appear to be wholly compatible with and am­
ply supported by Rowley. A federal district court in Eastern Mis­
souri reached this conclusion in March, 1983, when it held that 
Missouri's policy of refusing to provide more than 180 days of edu­
cation for children with severe handicaps is incompatible with the 
EAHCA.163 The court found that, because the state policy pre­
cluded "individualized consideration of and instruction for each 
child," the state was failing to provide these children with "the basic 
floor of opportunity" embodied in the Act. l64 . 
Other pre-Rowley decisions described above requiring the pro­
vision of psychological programming services,165 residential 106 or 
157. See supra text accompanying notes 118-20. 
158. See 102 S. Ct. at 3051-52 & 3051 nn.27-30. 
159. See supra note 131. 
160. See 102 S. Ct. 3041-42; see also supra note 57. 
161. 629 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom., Scanlon v. Battle. 452 U.S. 
968 (1981). 
162. Id at 280. 
163. Yaris v. Special School Dist., 51 U.S.L.W. 2553 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 2, 1983). 
164. Id. at 2554. The coun also held that because Missouri receives federal funds 
that it distributes to local school districts for the purpose of educating children with 
handicaps during the summer months, without comparable services for children with 
severe handicaps, the state was also in violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973. See supra note 80. 
165. See supra note 65. 
166. See supra note 66. 
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private schoo1'67 placements, or higher teacher/student ratiosl 68 
would also appear to be subject to this "meaningful benefit" rule. As 
discussed above,169 however, the Court in Rowley provided no gui­
dance for determining the adequacy of the benefit required other 
than emphasizing its individualized nature. I7O Thus, decisions in 
cases of this nature will more than likely continue to reflect the indi­
vidual perceptions of school administrators, hearing officers, and 
judges regarding "adequacy" of the benefit as well as the individual 
needs of the students involved. For example, in one post-Rowley 
opinion, 17 I the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the 
district court had "ample authority under the Act" to order the 
placement of a severely retarded boy with "autistic-like" behavior in 
a residential program upon finding that he needed residential care 
with "round-the-clock training . . . in order to make any. educa­
tional progress." 172 
It is also quite likely that in making these decisions, the test sug­
gested in Justice Blackmun's concurrence will figure largely, at either 
a conscious or subconscious level, whether the child's program, 
"viewed as a whole, offer[s] [the child] an opportunity to understand 
and participate in the classroom [on a basis] substantially equal to 
167. See supra note 59. In Lang v. Braintree School Comm., ~45 F. Supp. 1221 (D. 
Mass. 1982), one of the few relevant post-Rowley decisions reported. the federal district 
court in Massachusetts refused to order continued private schooling for an eighteen year 
old student with mental retardation, mental illness, and epilepsy. The court, however, 
recognizing that the student's IEP reflected the EAHCA's "legitimate educational philos­
ophy" of mainstreaming, found that "there is every reason to believe, that [the student's) 
placement in a public school setting, with the proper special education and support serv­
ices, would be of greater benefit to her than remaining in a private school setting." Id at 
1228. In similar fashion, the North Carolina Court of Appeals recently affirmed a lower 
state court's decision that a hearing-impaired child need not be transferred from a public 
to a private school in order to satisfy the appropriate education requirements of both the 
EAHCA and the state special ed.ucation statute. Harrell v. Wilson County Schools, 293 
S.E.2d 687 (N.c. Ct. App.), appeal denied, 295 S.E.2d 759 (N.C. 1982),pelilionjor cerl. 
filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3512 (U.S. Jan. 3, 1983) (No. 82-1111). The North Carolina court 
noted that the child's public school program had been developed in substantial compli­
ance with federal and state rules for IEP's, that it is consistent with federal and state 
mainstreaming policies, and that it meets even the more rigorous state standard that "a 
handicapped child should be given an opportunity to achieve his full potential commen­
surate with that given other children." 293 S.E.2d at 690. 
168. Colin K. v. Schmidt, 536 F. Supp. 1375 (D.R.1. 1982). 
169. See supra text accompanying notes 121-22. 
170. "It is clear that the benefits obtainable by children at one end of the spectrum 
will differ dramatically from those obtainable by children at the other end, with infinite 
variations in between." 102 S. Ct. at 3053. 
171. Abrahamson v. Hershman, No. 82-1201, slip op. (1st Cir. Feb. 24,1983). 
172. ld, slip op. at 12 (citation omitted) (emphasis in origimil). 
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[the child's] nonhandicapped classmates."173 
It is interesting to speculate on the effect that Rowley would 
have had on the M. W. case l74 had Rowley been decided first. Con­
trary to Rowley, the M W. ruling required provision of a sign lan­
guage interpreter and other supplemental aids and services to 
facilitate the continued "mainstreaming" of a seriously hearing-im­
paired child who had maintained a "B" average in regular class­
rooms without such aids, but with the voluntary assistance of his 
family and certain teachers and students. The decision, however, 
was made by a school department hearing officer. If the school 
board had appealed the decision to federal courts, the issue becomes 
whether the judiciary would have substantially deferred to the state 
educational agency as called for in Rowley, I7S or would have applied 
the Supreme Court's "benefit" test. A preliminary question, how­
ever, is as to whether the hearing officer's order would have been the 
same had it not preceded Rowley. 
V. THE ROLE OF PARENTS AFTER ROWLEY 
In Rowley, the Supreme Court of the United States placed con­
siderable emphasis on the vital role Congress has assigned to parents 
and guardians in assuring the appropriateness of handicapped chil­
dren's education under the EAHCA. At one point the Court stated 
that "Congress sought to protect individual children by providing for 
parental involvement in the development of State plans and policies 
. . . and in the formulation of the child's individual education pro­
gram."176 Elsewhere, it observed that "Congress placed every bit as 
much emphasis upon compliance with procedures giving parents 
and guardians a large measure of participation at every stage of the 
administrative process . . . as it did upon the measurement of the 
resulting IEP against a substantive standard." 177 Yet again the 
Court observed that "[t]he requirements that parents be permitted to 
file complaints regarding their child's education, and be present 
when the child's IEP is formulated, represent only two examples of 
Congress' effort to maximize parental involvement in the education 
of each handicapped child."178 Finally, the Court concluded that, 
173. 102 S. Ct. at 3053 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
174. in re M.W.. No. S1979-1 (Floyd County, Ga., Bd. of Educ. Mar. 6, 1979). 
175. "[C]ouns must be careful to avoid imposing their view of preferable educa­
tional methods upon the States." 102 S. Ct. at 3051 (citation omitted). 
176. id. at 3052 (citation omitted). 
177. id. at 3050. 
178. id. at 3038 n.6. 
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"[a]s this very case demonstrates, parents and guardians will not lack 
ardor in seeking to ensure that handicapped children receive all of 
the benefits to which they are entitled by the Act." 179 
There is no question that the Court read accurately Congress' 
intent regarding the central role parents and guardians should play 
in the functioning of EAHCAI80 It was therefore ironic and distres­
sing that, less than six weeks after these expressions of agreement by 
the legislative and judicial branches supporting a key parental role, 
the executive branch of the federal government should attempt to 
weaken that role. On August 4, 1982, the United States Department 
of Education proposed to amend the regulations for the EAHCAI81 
in order, the Department said, "[t]o reduce fiscal and administrative 
. burdens on recipients ... and ... to address various problems that 
have arisen in the implementation of the program ...."182 The 
effect, however, of a number of the proposed revisions would have 
been to reduce parents' involvement in the planning and review of 
their handicapped children's education programs. The proposal 
would, for example, have eliminated requirements for parental con­
sent before a pre-placement evaluation is conducted or an initial 
placement is made. 183 The proposal would have also reduced re­
quirements designed to ensure parental participation at IEP meet­
ings,184 and eliminated parents' right of access to all evidence before 
a due process hearing. 185 
These were among a multitude of changes l86 that were viewed 
179. Id. at 3052. 
180. Even before the Rowley decision, lower courts had enforced the EAHCA 
mandates for parental involvement. See, e.g., Vogel v. School Bd., 491 F. Supp. 989 
(W.D. Mo. 1980). 
181. Assistance to States for Education of Handicapped Children, 47 Fed. Reg. 
33,836 (1982) (proposed regulation to be codified at 34 C.F.R. § 3(0). 
182. id. 
183. Id. at 33,841, discussing proposed deletion of requirements in 34 C.F.R. 
§ 300.504(b) (1982). . 
184. 47 Fed. Reg. 33,840 (1982), discussing proposed deletion of requirements in 
34 C.F.R. §§ 300.345(b)-(d) (1982). 
185. Provisions of current regulation, 34 C.F.R. § 300.508(a)(3) (1982), not in­
cluded in proposed regulation. See 47 Fed. Reg. 33,857 (1982) (proposed regulation to 
be codified at 34 C.F.R. § 300.149). 
186. Other changes included, but were not limited to the proposed deletion of a 
thirty-day timeline between a child's evaluation and the IEP meeting; elimination of par­
ents' right to open due process hearings to the public; new authorization to charge par­
ents for a portion of the services a child receives while placed in a residential program; 
deletion of requirements that schools provide children with handicaps a continuum of 
placements and services, and educate a child as close to horne as possible; and the dele­
tion of a requirement that evaluation instruments be administered or validated by "qual­
ified" personnel. See OverSight on Education lor All Handicapped Chl1dren Act: Hearings 
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by many parents and other advocates for children with handicaps as 
assailing some of EAHCA's most important safeguards for ensuring 
the provision of an appropriate education. 187 At public hearings 
held in eight cities across the nation,188 parents, demonstrating some 
of the "ardor" of which Justice Rehnquist wrote,189 raised a "storm 
of protest."190 As a result, Secretary of Education, T.H. Bell, an­
nounced on September 29, 1982, that he was withdrawing the pro­
posed changes for "[t]hose portions of the regulations that are the 
major sources of the concern and apprehension." 191 Included in the 
. six areas of withdrawn proposals was that dealing with "parental 
consent prior to evaluation or initial placement."192 
Several members of Congress and numerous advocates have ex­
pressed concern, however, that the Department may resubmit with­
drawn sections at a later date "in milder form."193 A memorandum 
to Tom Anderson, Special Counsel to the Secretary of Education, 
from Joe Beard, Deputy General Counsel of the Department, al­
though repudiated by Bell,194 lends support to these concerns. The 
memo suggests that it 
might be a good idea to consider sending [the Department's final 
regulation] up [to Congress] in two or more packages, with the less 
controversial part. in one package, and the more controversial 
Bifore the Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human 
Resources, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 79-86 (1982) (statement of B.E. Hamilton. Education 
Oir., Children's Defense Fund) [hereinafter cited as Hearings); id. at 99-162 (statement of 
Terrell Bell, Secretary, United States Department of Education) (defense of the proposed 
regulations). 
187. Senator Edward Kennedy: "I think it is important to note that in many ways 
these regulations go against the grain of the recent Supreme Court decision in ... Row­
ley. The Supreme Court strongly affirmed that the ultimate goal of the act was to pro­
vide the handicapped student with an adequate educational opportunity. The schools 
must provide meaningful services to the students. And to do so. parental involvement is 
essential." Hearings, supra note 184, at 27; see also id. at 76-86 (statement of B.E. Hamil­
ton); id. at 87-98 (statement of H. Rutherford Turnbull lll. Secretary. Association for 
Retarded Citizens of the United States); Senator Q.N. Burdick also stated that "in some 
cases, the rights of the handicapped children would be weakened if these proposals were 
to be implemented as currently written .... Any changes which reduce a parent's par­
ticipation must be critically scrutinized and questioned." Id. at 163-65. 
188. See 47 Fed. Reg. 39,652 (1982). 
189. See \02 S. Ct. at 3052. 




192. 47 Fed. Reg. 49,871-72 (1982). Other proposals withdrawn related to least 
restrictive environment, related services, timelines, attendance of evaluation personnel at 
IEP meetings and qualifications of personnel. Id. 
193. Boston Globe, Sept. 30, 1982, at 3, col. 1. 
194. Id. 
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parts in several packages .... In this manner, certain controver­
sial parts will not kill off the less controversial parts, and, also, we 
may be able to divide the enemy .... 'By forcing separate votes, 
we may be able to pull it off. On the other hand, Congress may 
find this to be a trick, which it definitely is, and may react nega­
. I 195 .tlve y .... 
As this article goes to press, the Department has not yet issued 
either final revised regulations, or proposed regulations to replace 
those which were withdrawn. 196 . 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Although there are surprising discrepancies among various 
courts of the number of children with handicaps who are receiving 
special education and related services nationwide,197 all data indi­
195. Note to Tom Anderson from Joe Beard, Office of the General Counsel, 
United States Department of Education (Mar. 30, 1982) (on file at the Center for Law 
and Health Sciences. Boston University School of Law). 
196. It was reported that proposed regulations for section 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973 may also be published for public comment in late 1983. Mental Health Law 
Project, Update I (Mar. 28, 1983). These proposals, which were issued by the United 
States Department of Justice, might also have significantly affected public education for 
children with handicaps. See supra notes 57, 80, 164. In a class action brought in New 
Mexico, which has elected not to accept federal funds under EAHCA, the Court of Ap­
peals for the Tenth Circuit noted that when a state permits "great disparity among the 
various school districts in their treatment of handicapped students," it arguably violates 
section 504. New Mexico Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. New Mexico, 678 F.2d 847, 855 
(10th Cir. 1982). Plaintiffs and defendants have since signed an agreement that was sub­
mitted to the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico for approval. 
New Mexico Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. New Mexico, No. 75-633-M (D.N.M.) (settle­
ment agreement Aug. 3 J, 1982). On March 2 I. 1983, however, Vice President George 
Bush, in a letter to Robert J. Funk of the Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund, 
announced that the Department of Justice and the Presidential Task Force on Regula­
tory Relief "have decided not to issue a revised set of coordination guidelines [for section 
504)." The Vice President noted that, in the review process which arrived at this deci­
sion. "[e) specially important were the personal views and experiences of those most di· 
rectly affected by these regulations. The comments of handicapped individuals, as well 
as their families, provided invaluable insight into the impact of the 504 guidelines." Let­
ter from Vice President of the United States George Bush to Robert J. Funk (Mar. 2J, 
1983) (on file at the Center for Law and Health Sciences, Boston University School of 
Law). 
197. The General Accounting Office (GAO) reports that an Office of Special Edu­
cation (OSE) survey calculated that a total of "4,178,631 handicapped children, or 8.55 
percent of the estimated 5-17 year old population, were reported as receiving special 
education and related services in the 1980-81 school year. OCR (Office for Civil Rights) 
data supplied by school districts indicate that 2,615,852 children received special educa­
tion. Another survey, using information supplied by school principals, estimated that 
slightly over 3 million children ages 3-21 were receiving special education on December 
I, 1978." Disparities Still Exist, supra note 27, at 20 (footnotes omitted). A GAO analy­
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cate that, during the past decade, the United States has moved a con­
siderable distance toward fulfilling the historic promise of a free 
public education for all. 198 This progress has been spurred by state 
and federal litigation and legislation, but principally by federal Pub­
lic Law 94-142, the Education for All Handicapped Children Act.l99 
In Board v. Education v. Rowley,200 the Supreme Court of the United 
States, although adopting a very limited view of Congress' goals in 
passing the Act, did uphold the Act's basic guarantees. Most impor­
tantly, the Court limited its holding concerning the adequacy of edu­
cational services to the particular case of Amy Rowley. The Court 
explicitly refused to set forth a general standard for measuring the 
sufficiency of services provided to other children. The Court also 
recognized that despite the fact that a child with handicaps is ad­
vancing from grade to grade in a regular public school classroom, 
one may not automatically conclude that the child is receiving an 
appropriate education. 
Questions of program adequacy are thus left primarily to the 
IEP development and appeal process for individualized determina­
tions. Advocates for children with handicaps would therefore be 
well advised to contest inappropriate or inadequate plans at the ear­
liest possible point in the administrative process. As the Court rec­
ognized, parents and guardians can play a key role in this process. 
In light of recent attempts to reduce parental involvement, it is clear 
that, for the foreseeable future, continuing vigilance and advocacy 
will be required of parents and all others concerned with the welfare 
of children with handicaps to ensure that they are not deprived of 
their hard-won right to a free appropriate public education. 
sis of differences between the OSE and OCR data indicates that they may be attributable, 
inler alia, to different data collection methods and timing of data collection, but con­
cludes that further investigation is needed. Id at 21-26. 
198. "While the findings indicate that not all children have equal access to special 
education, the Congressional objective that those most in need of services would receive 
them with Public Law 94-142 has largely been accomplished. The priorities to first serve 
the unserved and second the most severely handicapped children within each category 
may have been realized and, therefore, may have become meaningless ...." Id at 80. 
199. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1420 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
200. 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982). 
